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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SEARCH AND SEIZURE-POST-
SEARCH DISCLAIMER OF OWNERSHIP, STANDING
ALONE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
ABANDONMENT
In September of 1988, David Huether was stopped by high-
way patrol officer Rick Michels for speeding.' Officer Michels, sus-
picious that there might be an open alcohol container, asked
Huether whether he could search his pick-up truck, and Huether
consented.2 During the search, Michels saw a brown paper bag
partly under the seat.3 As Michels pulled the bag from under the
seat, Huether told him it contained only garbage.4 Michels then
opened the bag and discovered packets of what he believed to be a
controlled substance.5 Huether denied both owning the bag and
knowledge of its contents.6 He was arrested and charged with pos-
session with intent to deliver a controlled substance.7 The trial
1. State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778, 780 (N.D. 1990). See also Suppression Hearing
Transcript at 9, State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778 (N.D. 1990) (No.890261) [hereinafter
Suppression Hearings Transcript] (available at the Thormodsgard Law Library, University
of North Dakota). Michels testified that on September 24, 1988, at approximately 5:45 p.m.,
"[t]he defendant was clocked at 66 miles an hour," traveling east on Highway 21
approximately two to three miles east of New Leipzig, North Dakota. Id. at 8-9.
2. See Suppression Hearings Transcript supra note 1, at 12-13. The suppression
hearings took place nine and one-third months after the arrest. Id. at 1. At the time of the
arrest, Officer Michels was a seven year veteran with the North Dakota State Patrol. Id. at
3. Officer Michels testified that he had received an Associate Degree in law enforcement
from the University of Corrections State School of Science and, in addition, had completed
two years of training at the academy in Alexandria, Minnesota. Id' Officer Michels also
testified that his training with the Highway Patrol and the academy included what alcoholic
beverages smell like, how they are packaged, and the appearance and demeanor of a
person drinking alcohol. Id. at 6. Officer Michels testified that when the stop took place,
Huether immediately exited his car and came back to the squad car. Id. at 9. Officer
Michels also testified that if a subject of a police stop exits the vehicle rapidly, it may be to
prevent the officer from approaching and detecting alcohol in the vehicle. Id. at 7. Officer
Michels testified that after Huether came back to the squad car, he detected the odor of
alcohol on Huether. Id. at 12. During questioning of Huether about whether he had been
drinking, Huether admitted that he had a "couple beers" at "Oktoberfest" in New Leipzig.
Id. Officer Michels testified that Huether volunteered that the officer could search the pick-
up and also volunteered that he had an unopened six-pack inside his vehicle. Id. at 12-13.
3. Id. at 22. Officer Michels testified that when he opened the driver's door, he saw the
six-pack on the passenger floor and a small sack on the floor, sticking partly out from under
the middle of the seat. Id. Huether testified that because his pick-up was equipped with an
automatic transmission and bench seat, there was approximately one and one-half inches
between the floor and the seat. Id. at 46-47.
4. Suppression Hearings Transcript, supra note 1, at 23. Officer Michels testified that
Huether immediately stated, before he opened the bag, that it contained only garbage. Id.
5. Id. at 24-25. Officer Michels testified that he knew, by the weight of the paper bag,
that it did not contain any full alcoholic beverage containers. Id. at 24. He did not consider,
before opening the bag, whether, by its weight and appearance, it could contain any empty
containers, but he immediately thought that it may have contained a can with some fluid
inside. Id. at 24-25.
6. Id. at 26. Officer Michels testified that after he pulled two individual packets
containing a controlled substance out of the bag, Huether immediately asked what the
substance was. Id.
7. State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778, 780 (N.D. 1990). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-
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court granted Huether's motion to suppress evidence found, in the
bag." The State appealed, asserting that because Huether denied
ownership of the bag, he lacked standing to contest its search.9
The State also contended that the search of the bag was within
Huether's consent and was valid because the officer had probable
cause to believe it contained an open, alcoholic beverage
container.' 0 The North Dakota Supreme Court, affirming the dis-
trict court decision, held that (1) Huether did not abandon the
paper bag containing the controlled substance, (2) the officer
exceeded the scope of consent when he opened the partially con-
cealed paper bag, and (3) the officer did not have probable cause
to believe the paper bag concealed an alcoholic beverage
container." State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778 (N.D. 1990).
A motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search allegedly
conducted in violation of the fourth amendment 12 often raises the
issue of whether the moving party may properly challenge the
constitutionality of the search.'" The issue is usually framed in
terms of whether the party has standing to seek relief.' 4 Requir-
ing a party seeking relief to have a personal stake in the outcome
assures a truly adversarial posture which, in turn, draws the court's
focus to the legal questions and constitutional issues involved.'5
The standing rule also prohibits vicarious fourth amendment alle-
23(1)Xb) (classifying possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver as a class B
felony).
8. Memorandum Opinion of Appendix at 5, State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778 (N.D.
1990) (No. 890261) [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion] (available at Thormodsgard Law
Library, University of North Dakota).
9. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 780.
10. Id. at 782.
11. Id. at 781, 783.
12. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CON ST. amend. IV.
13. 4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.3 at 279 (2d ed. 1987) (the exclusionary
rule, which commands that material acquired during an unconstitutional search is not
admissible as evidence, may only be exercised by a party with a justifiable claim).
14. Id. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1972) (standing to sue requires
that a party have a sufficient stake in the outcome of a justifiable controversy that can be
redressed by judicial resolution). But cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (to assure
that personal rights are, through exclusion of evidence, only enforced by those deprived of
fourth amendment protection, the proper analysis considers the extent of those rights,
rather than invocation of an external, yet intertwined, doctrine of standing).
15. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962) (claimants in class action to enjoin the
execution of further elections under Apportionment Act were found to suffer gross
disproportion of representation sufficient for standing when the injury asserted by the
claimants was that the Act placed them in a position of unjustifiable inequality compared to
voters residing in counties favored by the Act).
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gations: only those whose rights were allegedly violated have a
basis to invoke those rights.' 6 It is not enough that a party moving
to suppress evidence is prejudiced by a seizure directed at some-
one else; the movant himself must be the victim of the search.' 7
In determining who is properly considered the victim of a
search, courts have, at times, relied on property principles to base
standing on a proprietary interest in the place searched 18 or a pos-
sessory interest in the material seized.' 9 However, an expansive
number of exceptions developed as courts relying upon property
principles sought to protect private places through intensively
fact-oriented inquiries.2"
Adherence to the property basis for fourth amendment analy-
sis also posed problems for law enforcement officials by requiring
that items seized be more than simply an indication of crime. 2'
Unless proven to be contraband, an instrumentality, or the fruit of
crime, a party's property interest in an item seized was often
deemed superior to the public's interest in "mere evidence. "22
16. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). Compare Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 260-67 (1960) (the defendant, accused of a possessory offense, legally present but not
residing in apartment which was searched, was deemed to have "automatic standing" to
question the legality of the search because the same possession needed to establish standing
was an essential element of the offense charged) with United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83,
87-89 (1980) (expressly overruling Jones by eliminating the "automatic standing" rule,
explaining that the issue of whether one may challenge the legality of a search is simply a
question of whether one's rights were violated by the search).
17. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 227-30 (1973) (claimants who had no
legitimate expectation of privacy or interest lacked standing).
18. Mickenberg, Fourth Amendment Standing After Rakas v. Illinois: From Property
to Privacy and Back, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 197, 204 (1981) [hereinafter Mickenberg]
(describing standing based either on a property right in the area searched (such as a
homeowner's right to challenge a search of that home) or a possessory interest in the area
searched (such as an apartment dweller's right to challenge a search of his or her home)).
But cf. Jones v. United States 362 United States 257, 267 (1960) (holding that standing could
be established merely when one was lawfully on the premises searched).
19. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52-54 (1951) (defendant who stored narcotics
in hotel room he did not occupy, and without the occupant's knowledge, nonetheless had
standing).
20. Mickenberg, supra note 18, at 203 (piecemeal approach to fourth amendment
analysis forced the United States Supreme Court to accommodate the inadequacies of
undue reliance on property notions by extending fourth amendment protection to purely
nonproprietary situations). See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) (passenger of
rented taxicab is protected by fourth amendment). See also Chapman v. United States, 365
U.S. 610 (1961) (rented apartment is considered a private place and is therefore protected
from unreasonable search and seizure).
21. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306-09 (1921). The government attempted
to use seized contracts against the defendant to show his participation in a conspiracy to
defraud the government. Id. The warrant was deemed unavailable for use as a tool to gain
access to defendant's house solely to search for evidence to be used against him. Id. at 309.
Thus, the "mere evidence" rule conferred on the government the right to search and seize
property only when the government was entitled to claim an interest superior to that of the
owner or possessor of the property, such as in confiscating stolen property. Mickenberg,
supra note 18, at 204.
22. Id. Contra Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-02 (1967) (reversing Gouled
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However, the United States Supreme Court departed from this
proprietary view in United States v. Katz2 3 by announcing that the
fourth amendment protects people, not places. 4 The point at
which a person can claim reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion became the standard for determining
when a person's fourth amendment rights were implicated."5 Yet,
inquiries from such a fundamental starting point continued to
revolve around whether the person had a property interest in the
place searched or in the items seized.2"
As fourth amendment analysis evolved from proprietary to
privacy notions, court analysis in vehicle searches began to center
on whether a search infringed upon the subject's expectation of
freedom from governmental intrusion.2 ' But courts also recog-
nized a lesser degree of privacy in vehicles, due to their mobility28
and their exposure to public view. 29  In Rakas v. Illinois,3 0 the
United States Supreme Court discarded a patchwork of precedent
and turned to what is viewed as the more restrictive "legitimate
expectation of privacy" standard.3 1  In Rakas, police officers
because "mere evidence" rule did not advance principal objective of fourth amendment of
protecting privacy).
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (agent's attachment of wiretap
recorder on phone booth held impermissible because intrusion went to area from which
defendant sought to exclude others).
25. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364,368 (1968) (fourth amendment protection hinges
on whether there was "a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion").
But cf. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980) (placing property in companion's
purse diluted defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy, because defendant could no
longer control access of others to articles in purse).
26. Mickenburg, supra note 18, at 209 (Katz had no significant impact on development
of fourth amendment law). See also Note, The Relationship Between Trespass and Fourth
Amendment Protection After Katz v. United States, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 709, 710 (1977). The
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test fails to protect in situations in which a person's
right to be secure in his or her own home is violated, but his or her right to privacy has not
been violated. Id. The reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine merely supplements
fourth amendment analysis based on the trespass doctrine, which triggers fourth
amendment protection upon an officer's unauthorized entry upon property of another. Id.
27. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (that which a person intends to keep private, "even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected").
28. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (warrantless vehicle search and
seizure of illegal alcohol hidden within rear seat upholstery deemed reasonable for the
purpose of conserving public interest due to transient means employed in executing illegal
activity). See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970) (delayed search of
automobile used in armed bank robbery was upheld, because unforeseeable circumstances
most often provide probable cause, while opportunity to search movable automobile is
fleeting).
29. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (officer sighting stolen vehicle parts lying
within plain view inside vehicle did not violate fourth amendment in seizing, without a
warrant, the instruments of crime); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S 128, 148-49 (1978) (there exists
a significantly different expectation of privacy in vehicles than in the privacy and freedom
traditionally associated with one's residence).
30. 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978).
31. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12 (overruling Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
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stopped a suspected getaway car in which the defendants were
passengers.32 The defendants were arrested after officers found a
shotgun under the seat and shotgun shells in the glovebox.3 3 The
defendants challenged the admission of the gun and shells into evi-
dence, but the trial court ruled that they lacked standing to chal-
lenge the search because they did not own the gun, shells, or car. 34
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that passengers
do not, by mere status as passengers, have standing with regard to
the interior of the vehicle.35 The Court also discarded the theoret-
ically separate concept of standing in determining whether a
defendant is entitled to exclude material obtained by an unreason-
able search.36
Subsequently, in United States v. Salvucci,37 the Court
replaced the automatic standing doctrine with the "legitimate
expectation of privacy" standard.38 In applying this standard,
courts have held that placing property in control of another relin-
quishes one's prior legitimate expectation of privacy.39 Likewise,
(1960)). "Legitimate" expectation of privacy must be one which society recognizes as
reasonable, and requires more than a "subjective expectation of not being discovered." Id.
An expectation of privacy need not be based on common-law property interests; however,
the Court continues to use such concepts in determining whether a privacy interest exists.
Id. Rakas' emphasis on property law in search and seizure questions, while not requiring a
privacy interest to be based on common-law property concepts, does allow a court to rely
exclusively on these concepts when there are noother means of avoiding suppression of
evidence.
32. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130. An officer on routine patrol after receiving a description of
a getaway car used in a store robbery spotted a vehicle fitting the description. Id. The
officer followed the vehicle for some time and then stopped the vehicle after assistance
arrived. Id.
33. Id. "Officers discovered a box of shotgun shells in the glove compartment, which
had been locked, and a sawed-off shotgun under the front passenger seat." Id. Thereafter,
the officers took the defendants to the police station and arrested them. Id.
34. Id. at 129-30. The defendants claimed they were never asked if they owned the
shotgun or shells. Id. at 130 n. 1. They argued on appeal that if the court were to determine
that a property interest in the seized items were adequate grounds for standing, then the
court should have remanded the case to determine whether defendants did own the seized
shotgun or shells. Id.
35. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-50. The majority held that the petitioners, who asserted
neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile searched nor an interest in
the property seized, and who failed to show that they had any legitimate expectation of
privacy in the glove compartment or the area under the seat upon which they were mere
passengers, were not entitled to challenge a search of those areas. Id.
36. Id. at 139-40. The Court enunciated an approach that "forthrightly focuses on the
extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any
theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing." Id. at 139.
37. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
38. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980). The determination is not
dependent on standing, but whether one's rights were violated by the search or seizure. Id.
at 87 n.4.
39. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980) (defendant lacked standing to
object to search of companion's purse containing defendant's contraband, because
defendant did not have right to exclude others from access to purse). See also United States
v. Koessel, 706 F.2d 271, 274 (8th Cir. 1983) (defendant, remaining in immediate area, lost
privacy in drug sample by giving it to middleman for prospective buyer to try).
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an owner loses his legitimate expectation of privacy in a container
when he abandons it. 40 However, courts have recognized the dis-
tinction between abandonment and a denial of ownership made in
order to avoid incriminating oneself, which has been held insuffi-
cient to extinguish one's legitimate expectation of privacy in a dis-
claimed container.41  But courts have also recognized such
disclaimers as a basis for defeating standing for fourth amendment
purposes.42
In State v. Benjamin, 43 the North Dakota Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the defendant had standing for a fourth amend-
ment challenge when a warranted search of his trailer home, in
which he was neither present nor resided, resulted in the seizure
of four grams of marijuana. The court rejected the "automatic
standing rule," which guaranteed that a person charged with a
possessory crime could challenge the legality of a search.4 4 In
addition to adopting the legitimate expectation of privacy stan-
dard, the North Dakota Supreme Court also relied on Rakas in
rejecting the "target theory," which automatically imputed stand-
ing to a person against whom a search was directed.45
The North Dakota Supreme Court again examined the issue of
fourth amendment standing in State v. Huether.46 Huether based
his assertion of standing on vehicle ownership and a statutorily
created possessory interest in the narcotics that were discovered
40. United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1318 (5th Cir. 1974) (defendants' refusal
to claim luggage checked at airport meant a loss in their legitimate expectation of privacy;
therefore, they lacked standing with which to contest the warrantless search). See also State
v. Kerr, 143 Vt. 597, -, 470 A.2d 670, 676 (1983) (defendant's denial of any interest in bag
containing narcotics dislodged his standing to contest search of the bag).
41. State v. Isom, 196 Mont. 330, -, 641 P.2d 417, 422 (1982) (refusing to incriminate
oneself in response to police interrogations cannot eliminate fourth amendment rights).
Accord United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763 (8th Cir. 1984) (government may not
argue at suppression hearing that defendant did not own evidence and thus lacked
standing, while subsequently arguing to the jury that the evidence belonged to defendant).
See also State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, __, 291 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1982) (suspect's disclaimer
did not destroy his legitimate expectation of privacy in contents of suitcase which bore his
identification tag).
42. Miller v. State, 520 S.W.2d 729, 733-35 (Tenn. 1975) (denial of ownership
precluded defendant's standing to object to search of vehicle). See also State v. Brown, 412
So. 2d 24, 24-25 (Fla. 1982) (upon denying prior possession to police, defendant lost
expectation of privacy in luggage checked at airport).
43. 417 N.W.2d 838 (N.D. 1988).
44. State v. Benjamin, 417 N.w.2d 838, 839-40 (N.D. 1988). See generally United
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (overruling Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263
(1960) (possession, if the basis upon which one is charged, suffices to establish standing)).
45. Benjamin, 417 N.W.2d at 840 (declining to return to the theory that conferred
standing automatically upon a person merely on the basis that the person was the target of
the search). See generally Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (adherence to the
general rule that fourth amendment rights cannot be vicariously asserted prevents one
individual from asserting an independent constitutional right in order to exclude evidence
seized from another).
46. 453 N.W.2d 778, 780-81 (N.D. 1990).
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during the search. a7 The State contended that Huether's consent
acted as a waiver of any expectation of privacy he had in the vehi-
cle and, alternatively, that his denial of ownership of the bag left
him with no legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag.48 While
acknowledging that abandonment implies a renunciation of any
reasonable expectation of privacy, 49 the court recognized the
question of abandonment as a factual inquiry 0 and invoked the
clearly erroneous standard of review. 51 The court noted that the
district court had determined that Huether's disavowal of owner-
ship of the paper bag, standing alone, was not a renunciation of his
reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag.52 The court referred
to Huether's disclaimer as "'not necessarily the hallmark for
deciding the substance of a fourth amendment claim.' ,,53
In framing its inquiry along legitimate expectation of privacy
lines, the court reasoned that because ownership alone did not
necessarily establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, neither
could disavowal of ownership, standing alone, necessarily dislodge
one's reasonable expectation of privacy.54 This was especially true
because the bag in question was contained and controlled within
Huether's vehicle, an area in which the court recognized a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy for every container concealing its
contents.5
47. Appellee's Brief at 7, State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778 (N.D. 1990) (No. 890261)
(available at Thormodsgard Law Library, University of North Dakota).
48. Appellant's Brief at 29, State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778 (N.D. 1990) (No. 890261)
[hereinafter Appellant's Brief]. Appellant sought support from United States v. Veatch, 674
F.2d 1217 (8th Cir. 1981), asserting that Huether had relinquished his interest in the bag by
his actions. Appellant's Brief at 35-36. In Veatch, the defendant was deemed to have an
insufficient privacy interest in a billfold found in the backseat of an automobile where he
had been seated. Veatch, 674 F.2d at 1220-21. In response to an officer's inquiry as to
whether he wanted to take the wallet with him when ordered out of the car, the defendant
denied ownership of the wallet. Id. at 1219.
49. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 781. See also United States v. Alden, 576 F.2d 772, 777
(8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 855 (1978) (items seized from a trash pile, despite its
location adjacent to the defendant's residence, were deemed to be abandoned and thus
could not harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy interest).
50. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 780. See also United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 846
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (ultimate determination of whether defendant abandoned gym bag in
public hallway by walking away from it hinged on a factual inquiry into the intent of the
defendant).
51. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 781.
52. Id. The court based its decision on fifth amendment protection from self-
incrimination and deference to the trial court. Id. at 782.
53. Id. (quoting United States v. Hawkins, 681 F.2d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 994 (1982)).
54. Id. Accord Commonwealth v. Holloway, 9 Va. App. 11, 14, 384 S.E.2d 99, 104
(1989) (passenger's failure to respond to officer's inquiry about ownership of luggage did not
constitute passenger's intent to relinquish and thus did not dispel his expectation of privacy
in the luggage).
55. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 781. The court distinguished the placement of a container
confined within a vehicle and a container accessible to the public at large, noting that,
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The court also considered the time at which the denial of own-
ership was volunteered, recognizing that after a vehicle search
uncovers contraband, there exists a tension between one's privacy
interests and one's interest in avoiding self-incrimination. 56 The
court reasoned that requiring one to acknowledge a possessory
interest in such contraband for the purpose of maintaining a
privacy interest forces one to sacrifice his or her fifth amendment
rights in order to preserve his or her fourth amendment rights.
Refusing to condone such constitutional conflict, the court deter-
mined that a post-search disclaimer offered in effort to assuage
self-accusation could not, in and of itself, constitute
abandonment. 58
However, the court was unwilling to extend this protection to
passengers of a vehicle.59 It referred to United States v. Veatch,6
in which the defendant, by disclaiming ownership of a wallet lying
next to where he had been sitting on the back seat, lost his fourth
amendment protection in the wallet.6 For the North Dakota
Supreme Court, the defendant's passenger status distinguished the
case. 2 The Huether court's apparent reliance upon passenger sta-
"Huether did not discard or place the bag in a private place [and there was] little doubt that
[he] had an expectation of privacy in his vehicle and every container therein that concealed
its contents from plain view." Id.
56. Id. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing, in relevant part, "No person
shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself").
57. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 781. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
58. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 781. See State v. Machlah, 505 N.E.2d 873, 879 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987) ("reasonable expectation of privacy means an expectation at the time of the
search, not after [the] police have completed the search").
59. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 781 n.2. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (vehicle
passenger who was not the owner of the car had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
property placed in the glove compartment and under passenger seat of a car). But see
United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1253 n.4 (2d Cir. 1979) (court rejected the idea that
ownership is determinative and found that defendant, who had borrowed car, had standing
to challenge search).
60. 674 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1981).
61. United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1981). Veatch was a passenger in a
vehicle. Id. at 1219. The vehicle was stopped, and the officer, noting a wallet in plain view
in the back seat where Veatch had been sitting, asked Veatch if the wallet was his and if he
wanted to take it with him. Id. Veatch denied ownership of the wallet. Id. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that Veatch abandoned the wallet and any
reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Id. at 1222.
62. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 781 n.2. Veatch was one of three occupants in a vehicle he
had purchased with a fraudulent check. Veatch, 674 F.2d at 1219. In response to FBI
information that the car was fraudulently purchased, highway patrol officers stopped the
vehicle. Id. After the occupants peacefully stepped out of the vehicle, an officer noticed a
handgun and a wallet slightly wedged between the bottom and the backrest portions of the
seat where Veatch had been seated. Id. Search of the wallet, upheld on appeal, revealed
evidence admitted to incriminate Veatch. Id. at 1219-22. But ef. 4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE § 11.3(f) at 342 (2d ed. 1987) (explaining that the question is not whether the
defendant has shielded his effects from scrutiny against the entire world, but whether the
area was one in which he placed a "reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
intrusion" (quoting Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1967) and adding emphasis).
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tus appears to conflict with both the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Rakas, which cautioned that passenger status in a vehicle
should not automatically extinguish one's expectation of privacy.63
While legitimate presence does not control the validity of a police
search, it is, nonetheless, relevant to one's expectation of privacy.64
The State also alleged that the search of the bag was within
the scope of Huether's consent. 65 The consent search, as an excep-
tion to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the fourth
amendment,6 6 is often viewed by law enforcement as a preferable
means by which to execute a search. In addition to administra-
tive convenience, it may minimize the risk of suppression.6 8 To
the extent that the consenting party fails to qualify or carefully
condition his or her consent, the scope of search is broadened.69
Therefore, limitations, both express and implied, establish the per-
missible scope of consent.7 °
Consent to a request by police to search for a particular item
known to exist in a particular place authorizes the police to pro-
ceed only to that place, without searching elsewhere.7' When a
suspect's consent indicates he or she believes an officer has access
only to a certain area, the consent covers only that area.72 But
63. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149 n.17 (instant decision did not signal an absolute denial of
privacy interest for vehicle passengers). Justice White's dissent was critical of a holding that
would deny search of a vehicle merely on a basis of lack of possessory interest in the vehicle.
Id. at 161.
64. Id. at 147-48.
65. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 782.
66. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Whether consent to search
was voluntarily given was to be determined by the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 248-
49. The Court also determined that it was unnecessary for the state to show that the
consenting party knew they could refuse consent, and that such knowledge, while
applicable to the waiver of some constitutional rights relating to a fair trial, was not
applicable to the fourth amendment guaranty against unreasonable search and seizure. Id.
at 235-46.
67. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERc, DETECTION OF CRIME, at 159 (1967)
(law enforcement prefer the administrative convenience of consent searches).
68. May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 345 (Tex. Crim. 1981) (defendant's wife gave written
consent to a complete search of defendant's house, and such search was not invalid on the
theory that it allowed a general exploratory search).
69. Id. (consent authorized officers to conduct a complete search and seize any
property they desired).
70. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 240.3(1) (1975) (providing that
a consent search "shall not exceed, in duration or physical scope, the limits of the consent
given ... ").
71. People v. Schmoll, 383 Ill. 280, 287, 48 N.E.2d 933, 934 (1943) (physician's consent
for police to search one patient's file did not allow police to seize all files). But see People v.
Torand, 633 P.2d 1061, 1062 (Colo. 1981) (police are not expected to close their eyes to a
plainly visible article merely because its incriminating character is not presently apparent
to them).
72. United States v. Patacchia, 602 F.2d 218, 219 (9th Cir. 1979), opinion amended, 610
F.2d 648 (when defendant was willing to open car trunk for police inspection but also
expressed inability to do so because of failure of locking mechanism, police action of prying
trunk open went beyond consent). But see State v. Lash, 21 N.C. App. 365, 366, 204 S.E.2d
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where no limitation is placed on the specific areas of a vehicle
which are to be searched, and the consenting party does not object
during execution of the search, increasingly intrusive police activ-
ity may be viewed as lying within the scope of consent.7 3
When police indicate their purpose in requesting a search, it is
commonly considered a limitation on the scope, allowing no more
intrusion than necessary to meet their objective. 4 However,
police may, during execution of a consent search, seize evidence
found in plain view75 if the item seized indicates a crime. 76
In Huether, the court, in considering the scope of consent in a
warrantless search, first recognized the consent search as an
exception to both the warrant and probable cause requirements of
the fourth amendment.7 7 The court then adopted the prevalent
view that an officer's search pursuant to consent is limited by the
consent given, and must be conducted accordingly.78
563, 565 (1974) (suspect's explanation that she did not have the trunk key, offered with her
consent to search of car interior, held insufficient to limit officers from entering trunk
through back seat).
73. United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 891-92 (10th Cir. 1986) (defendant gave
permission by standing aside and expressing no concern when officer removed back seat
and back quarter panel). Accord United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 764 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (when police, after receiving permission to look
inside truck, extended search to engine compartment, driver's failure to object to
continuation of the search indicated search was within scope of initial consent).
74. People v. Torand, 622 P.2d 562, 565 (Colo. 1981). See also United States v.
Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 129-30 (7th Cir. 1971) (pursuant to consent search for narcotics,
police opening of incriminating documents deemed beyond scope of consent). But cf.
United States v. White, 706 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1983) (stated intent to search for
narcotics allowed search of flight bag as a place narcotics could reasonably be expected to
be concealed). See Gentile v. United States, 419 U.S 979,.980 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(Justice Douglas dissented from the denial of certiorari, arguing that, if valid, the consent
form was too narrow to allow seizure of evidence of unrelated crime). Cf. United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808-09 (1982) (permissible extent of a warrantless search based on
probable cause is no greater or less than where a search is based on a warrant obtained by
probable cause).
75. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d at 130 (noting that agents may seize indications of crime or
evidence of criminal behavior lying in plain view).
76. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967) (establishing test under which item
not indicated as object of search may be seized, requiring nexus between item seized and
criminal behavior).
77. State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778, 782 (N.D. 1990) (citing Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)) (the court, while upholding the search because driver
actually assisted officer's discovery of stolen checks, characterized as well settled law the
idea that consent search is a specifically established exception to warrant and probable
cause requirements). See United States v. Mines, 883 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 997 (1989) (whether search exceeds scope is a factual question). See also
N.D.R. Civ. P. 52(a) (providing, in relevant part that "findings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge of the credibility of the witnesses").
78. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 782. See United States v. McBean, 861 F.2d. 1570, 1573
n.6 (11th Cir. 1988) (" 'A defendant's consent may limit the extent or scope of a warrantless
search in the same way that the specifications of a warrant limit a search pursuant to that
warrant."' (quoting Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d at 129-30 n.3)). See also, Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S.
Ct. 1801 (1991). A consent to search car for narcotics included within its scope the consent
CASE COMMENT
The Huether court aligned with the trial court in determining
that the purpose of the search limited its scope.79 The court found
support in Officer Michels' testimony for the trial court's finding
that Michels was limited by Huether's consent to search for open
containers.8 0 The court reasoned that, given its appearance and
location, the bag could not reasonably have been expected to con-
ceal an alcoholic beverage container."' The court held that the
officer exceeded the scope of consent when he opened the par-
tially concealed paper bag.8 2 The determining factor was that the
bag had neither the weight nor the shape of an alcoholic beverage
container.8 3
The Huether court found it was impermissible for Officer
Michels to focus his search on the bag which, due to its weight and
size, could obviously not have held a bottle or can.8 4 In so doing,
the court tacitly applied to a consent search the same probable
cause requirement necessary for obtaining a warrant.85 The court
found support for this application in United States v. Ross,8" which
applied the same scope to a warrantless search based on probable
cause as is applied to a search executed under a warrant based on
probable cause.8 7 Acknowledging that Ross involved a warrantless
search conducted pursuant to probable cause rather than consent,
the court supported its decision to apply the Ross rule to consent
searches by stating that "[t]he rule articulated in Ross has also
been applied to consent searches."88
In taking this like-kind approach, the court recognized the
to search paper bag lying on the floor, because the general consent to search included the
consent to search containers in the car that might contain drugs. Id. at _.
79. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 782. Officer Michels stated at the preliminary hearing, "I
then asked Mr. Huether if I could check his vehicle, search for open containers, and he said,
yes, I could." Suppression Hearing Transcript, supra note 1, at 36.
80. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 782.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 783.
83. Id. at 782. The court noted that the officer overlooked a larger paper bag
containing an unopened six-pack and instead focused his search on a much smaller bag
tucked under the front seat. Id.
84. Id. "The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no more
narrow-and no broader-than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by
probable cause." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982).
85. Huether 453 N.W.2d at 782.
86. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
87. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 782.
88. Id. (citing United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 794-95 (11th Cir. 1985)
(concluding that officers did not exceed consent to search vehicle for narcotics when they
opened trunk and searched an unlocked suitcase found therein, because officers could
reasonably assume that narcotics could be found there)). See also United States v. White,
706 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1983) (even if officer's intent was to find money, consent to
search for narcotics allowed search of flight bag, because narcotics could reasonably be
expected to be found therein).
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consent search as stemming not from the basis of a constitutional
waiver but, instead, from the same basis as a probable cause
search: that police are only prohibited from making unreasonable
searches.8 9 Within this view, it is enough that the state show con-
sent was voluntary, not that the consenting party knew it could
withhold consent.90
The Huether court also considered the issue of whether
Officer Michels had probable cause to believe the paper bag con-
cealed an alcoholic beverage container. 1 Although vehicles may
be subject to a warrantless search even without exigent circum-
stances, police must have probable cause for such a search. 2 The
constitutional standard upon which probable cause is based is com-
monly stated as "reasonable grounds to believe" that a search will
yield evidence of a criminal act.93 It is generally accepted that the
requirements of reliability and particularity upon which an officer
may act in a warrantless search are no less stringent than when a
warrant is obtained.9 4 If this were not the case, officers would be
encouraged to forego procurement of a warrant.9 5 The mere
observation that a person possesses a type of bag or container in
which narcotics have often been concealed does not, by itself, give
rise to probable cause. 96 However, when accompanied by what
objectively appear to be furtive gestures, such observations may
89. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 782. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232
(1973) (if viewed as a waiver, there is doubt whether consent searches may be used, except
where the prosecution could show that the subject of the search was aware of his right to
refuse, because a waiver requires an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege).
90. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232-34.
91. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 782.
92. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1927) (prohibition agents were held to have
probable cause to search an automobile for illegal liquor upon recognition that vehicle may
be quickly removed from jurisdiction). See California v. Acevedo, No. 89-1690 (Supreme
Court of the United States, May 30, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, courts file) (construing
Carroll to provide one rule regarding search of containers within automobiles: Police, in a
search extending only to a container within an automobile, may search the container
without a warrant where they have probable cause to believe that it holds contraband or
evidence). See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970) (post-arrest warrantless
search of a vehicle yielded evidence that was admissible because there was no constitutional
difference between the immediate warrantless search of a car and the holding of a car until
a warrant was obtained).
93. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (the totality of information
which constitutes probable cause-evidence warranting the reasonable man to believe a
crime has been committed-must be measured by the facts).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 479-80. The Court cautioned that a "relaxation of the fundamental
requirements of probable cause would 'leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the
officers' whim or caprice."' Id. at 479 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949)).
96. People v. Young, 89 Mich. App. 753, 755, 282 N.W.2d 211, 213 (1979) (although
defendant dropped a tin foil packet, probable cause was lacking because criminal activity
cannot be inferred from mere possession of such a common material).
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properly substantiate probable cause.97
In Huether, the State argued that Officer Michels had prob-
able cause to believe the bag might conceal an open container.98
However, the court determined that the State's probable cause
argument failed, just as its consent argument failed, because the
trial court found that the bag could not reasonably be expected to
conceal an open container.' 9
The court viewed the issue of whether the officer had prob-
able cause as one requiring resolution of a factual conflict of testi-
monies.' 00 Deferring to the trial court's superior position to judge
the credibility of the testimony,' 0 ' the court reasoned that the
issue necessarily required resolution in favor of affirming the trial
court decision.10 2
Had the court accepted that probable cause existed, based on
its recognition that Officer Michels' belief that the bag could con-
ceal an open alcoholic beverage container was reasonable, it
would have validated search of the bag. 10 3  Such a validation
would allow traffic enforcement to be used as a device for search of
vehicles on the mere speculation that they contain contraband and
would have laid a foundation upon which law-abiding North
Dakotans could be subjected to capricious, exploratory searches. 0 4
Prior to Huether, the question in North Dakota of privacy in
97. Price v. United States, 429 A.2d 514, 517 (D.C. 1981) (probable cause existed where
defendant, in possession of manila envelope commonly used in drug sales, made attempt to
conceal envelope). But see People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d. 807, 822, 478 P.2d 449, 457-
61, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 737- 41 (1970) (the potential for misunderstanding gestures of vehicle
occupant suggests inferences should not be drawn; e.g., a driver's immediate exit from a
stopped vehicle may be motivated by a desire to appear cooperative).
98. State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778, 783 (N.D. 1990). Officer Michels testified that
Huether immediately exited his car when the stop took place. Suppression Hearing
Transcripts, supra note 1, at 9-12.
99. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 783. See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824
(1990) (the scope of a warrantless search is defined by the object of the search and places
where there is probable cause to believe it exists); State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 109-
10 (Minn. 1983) (officer searching vehicle for open containers could not reasonably be
expected to find the object of his search in an ashtray).
100. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 783.
101. Id. See State v. Pickar, 453 N.W.2d 783, 785 (N.D. 1990) (North Dakota Supreme
Court will reverse only if the trial court's decision is contrary to the weight of evidence).
102. Huether, 453 N.W.2d at 783. See State v. Lorenzen, 401 N.w.2d 508 (N.D. 1987)
(Lorenzen's conviction of driving while under the influence of alcohol was affirmed because
conflicts of testimony were resolved in favor of the trial court's finding).
103. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 8, at 4 (asserting that the search, even if based
on probable cause, would be restricted to the limited purpose of determining whether an
open receptacle containing an alcoholic beverage was concealed).
104. 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 3.6(d) at 61-62 (2d ed. 1987) (conclusions
drawn hastily from ambiguous gestures allow a traffic officer to search a vehicle on the
hunch that it might contain contraband). See also State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854,
858 (Minn. 1980) (driver's and passenger's nervous demeanor, after being informed that
they were being investigated for drug sales, was not sufficient basis for probable cause,
because their anxiety stemmed, in large part, from the investigation).
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the fourth amendment context was blurred, in the wake of Rakas
and Salvucci, by uncertainty about the role of proprietary and pos-
sessory interests in determining when one's rights have been vio-
lated.10 5  The court's affirmation of Huether's legitimate
expectation of privacy in the searched bag, despite his post-search
renunciation of ownership, establishes a guide to limit exploratory
searches in North Dakota.'06 Recognition by courts of a bright line
distinction between denial of ownership and abandonment,
together with defendants becoming aware of the availability of a
well-defined expectation of privacy rule, may result in more suc-
cessful motions to suppress evidence obtained by conjectural
searches.
However, expression by the court that a passenger's nonpro-
prietary status outweighs his or her expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion'0 7 marks a rejection of the privacy doc-
trine developed in Katz and Rakas.'0 8 The Rakas majority
emphasized that their holding did not stand for the proposition
that a passenger who is lawfully present in a vehicle, but who has
no possessory interest in it, lacks standing to challenge a search of
that vehicle. 109 Yet, some courts have so interpreted Rakas."10
Such an interpretation may reduce protection of legitimate expec-
105. State v. Klodt, 298 N.W.2d 783, 786 (N.D. 1980) (conferring "threshold standing"
based either on ownership or legitimate expectation of privacy in vehicle, or both). See also
Appellant's Brief 5-6, State v. Benjamin, 417 N.W.2d 838 (N.D. 1988) (No. 870040) (there is
no new, clearly enunciated rule on standing since State v. Lind, 322 N.W.2d 826 (N.D.
1982), made Salvucci applicable to North Dakota). See also United States v. Salvucci, 448
U.S. 83, 95 (1980) (overruling the automatic standing rule by holding that defendants
charged with crimes of possession may not automatically, by mere possession of articles
seized, challenge a search but instead may only benefit from the exclusionary rule if their
own fourth amendment rights have been violated). See also State v. Lind, 322 N.W.2d 826,
833 (N.D. 1982) (although the defendant in Lind was not charged with a possessory crime,
the North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that the charged crime of conspiracy, being
based on the overt act of possessing a controlled substance, was sufficiently analogous to a
possessory crime for Salvucci to apply).
106. State v. Huether, 453 N.W.2d 778, 781 (N.D. 1990) (expressing certainty that
defendant had an expectation of privacy in his car and in every container therein that
concealed its contents from plain view).
107. Id. at n.2 (stating that Veatch, because he was a passenger in a vehicle, did not
have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle).
108. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (expressly recognizing protection
for passengers of taxicabs). See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (relying on the
holding in Katz "that capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends
not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the
protection of the amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place").
109. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149 n.17. But see id. at 156-58, 165, 167 (White, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority for specifically holding that a legitimate occupant of an automobile may
not challenge a search of that vehicle if he does not own or have a possessory interest in it).
110. See United States v. Durant, 730 F.2d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 1984) (a mere
passenger in an automobile does not ordinarily have the legitimate expectation of privacy
necessary to challenge a proper search of that automobile). See also State v. Cowen, 104
Idaho 649, __, 662 P.2d 230, 231-32 (1983) (interpreting Rakas as a bar to passengers
questioning the stopping of a car); State v. Ribera, 183 Mont. 1, -, 597 P.2d 1164, 1169
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tations of privacy and again permit property interests to dominate
fourth amendment rights.
Gregg Waterman
(1979) (stating that, according to Rakas, passenger has no standing to challenge search of
automobile).
1991] 567

